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Traditional mythologies serve…four functions, the first of which might be described as the 
reconciliation of consciousness with the preconditions of its own existence. 
Joseph Campbell, “The Four Functions of Mythology” 
Campbell’s elucidation of the purposes of mythology extends, quite naturally, to be a useful lens 
for organizing the primary functions of all narrative expression.  Moreover, he subtly but 
convincingly upends the Aristotelian notion, per Poetics, of mimesis, or imitation, as being 
primary by listing his four functions progressively and placing the mimetic aspect second (with 
sociological and psychological aspects filling out the roster respectively).  In other words, 
according to Campbell, first our art must map the figurative topography of our world.  Only then 
can it proceed to depict the particularities thereof. 
And it is a unified world, singular, that Campbell assumes.  We might thereby conclude that this 
is lesson number one: no pluralizing of existence.  His very progression insists upon it: before we 
can emplace the nuances of groupings and mind states, first we must agree upon the limitations 
of possibility.  Milton’s Satan may have had a point beyond casuistry when he said “The mind is 
its own place and in itself/Can make a Hell of Heav’n, A Heav’n of Hell,” but he utters his words 
in the aftermath of a crushing defeat, and the fact of his expulsion will not be undone. 
Now, within the context of our theme—moral formation—it may be rightly pointed out that 
Campbell’s great philosophical forebear is Schopenhauer, he of the “world as will and idea.”  
Indeed, especially following his popular apotheosis as mystic-for-our-time via his widely-
disseminated interviews with Bill Moyers in the 1980s, Campbell’s philosophical trappings 
became obscured to the point of confusion.  But he very consistently remained throughout his 
career a genuine Pessimist in the Schopenhauer mold, i.e. one who affirms Idealism while 
insisting on the preponderance of suffering.   
As such, it could be objected that Campbell’s “preconditions” make for poor morality, since at 
best they are only an unyielding insistence upon the immutability of unpleasantness and at worst 
they are the animating anxieties of all manner of egomania.  This would appear poor stuff out of 
which to formulate generalized rules for living, let alone such that may distinguish right from 
wrong.    
But, of course, Campbell’s affinity with Schopenhauer extends even to this qualifying extent: 
truth, sans ironical quotation marks, is concomitant with good.  And even more remarkably, the 
aesthetic may be judged upon its fealty to truth, and therefore good.  Thus, when a given creation 
adheres to the preconditions of existence, it is or can be morally edifying and-- to a given extent-
-formative. 
So, besides an insistence upon “one world,” what are some of the other preconditions Campbell 
identifies?  We might assume, rather sweepingly, that mortality is a quite obvious precondition 
of existence.  But that is overdrawn.  In Campbell’s analysis—again mimicking Schopenhauer—
there are at least three issues comprised by the general category of “death”: 1. The Sisyphean 
futility and inherent incoherence of existence; 2. Suffering that is necessitated by that 
precondition when matched with a human being’s tendency toward desire or vanity; 3.  The 
ultimate crucible of choice between an embrace of the quixotic and a refusal of the struggle, i.e. 
“to be or not to be.” 
Before I discuss some works by Frost in light of the foregoing, it might be useful to note that I do 
not intend to suggest that his work is singular in its reflection of these preconditions.   On the 
contrary—I see all of these elements quite prominently in literature as varied as the Iliad, 
Hamlet, Don Quixote, all the novels of Hardy, Mann, and Cormac McCarthy, and much of the 
poetry of Wallace Stevens and John Koethe.  In effect, I see some of these themes practically 
everywhere.  Once one is conscious of the motif, it recurs so frequently that it cannot 
“unrecommend” itself.   
In that, it reminds me of a story I once read about scientists who had identified a toxin in some 
soil samples and—hoping to provide some basis for expressing its threat to the environment— 
kept broadening their sample size.  The toxin continued to turn up in every successive sample 
and in amounts the scientists had once thought aberrant.  Eventually, after they had tested 
enough samples to account for an area the size of large state, they were forced to conclude that—
though still undeniably deleterious of existence—the toxin was so ubiquitous that there was no 
basis for remedy.  In other words, people just had to live with it. 
In this, then, neither Frost nor his works is unique.  Rather, my attention to his work is motivated 
by a conviction that it is uniquely distillated along lines highly similar to Campbell’s formulation 
of preconditions.  That he “got there” apparently independent of Schopenhauer only, in my view, 
argues for the validity of the overall assertion, viz. that life comes with provisos with which we 
must contend and whose reality, if you will, is discrete from our formulations.  
Frost was a therapeutic nihilist.  Not officially, of course—that would be anachronistic.  He 
probably never knew much of an Austrian intellectual café movement from the first few decades 
of the twentieth century, but he was a kindred spirit.  In essence, the therapeutic nihilist asserts 
that the real ills of the world defy curing.  You can draft legislation, start an NPO, donate to your 
church and the American Cancer Society, volunteer your life away, or even become an assassin, 
but you’ll never solve the real problems, because the real problems are sic semper (thus always; 
too bad Booth knew the Latin but didn’t get the point).   
 
And his “real ills” are remarkably consistent in form and character with Campbell’s 
preconditions: that we live in one world independent of imaginative variation; that there is no 
comprehensible order in the world except that which we have the will to establish and maintain; 
that pain is an unavoidable consequence of our inevitable struggle; that we must choose between 
the negation of a futile existence and the embrace of a harrowing one.  And to this last, Frost 
adds his own particularizing caveat: choices are forever, and you’ll never know with certainty 
whether the choice was correct.  It was Seamus Heaney who once observed of Frost that his 
entire poetic manner seems to reside within the implied, fortitudinous challenge of “I’m ok; what 
about you?”  That’s quite right, and the larger meaning behind Trilling’s famous characterization 
of Frost as “terrifying.”  He takes us to the root of our fears via bucolic settings and by doing no 
more than inviting us to walk with him as he repairs the preconditions that lie figuratively yet 
insistently in field, swale, tree, and wall. 
Upon the point of an ultimately irreducible world, we begin with “Mending Wall,” a 45-line 
dramatic monologue perhaps most famous in non-literary circles for being among the very few 
pieces of literature ever cited in a Supreme Court decision (1995, Plauf v. Spendthrift Farms; 
Justices Scalia and Breyer).  But we consider it here for its deftly constructed rhetoric of 
inevitability underpinned with a deliciously fatalistic irony.  
 For those unfamiliar with the text, in sum it features a springtime ritual of repairing a rock wall 
undertaken by two neighbors.  One, the narrator, at first ruminates upon and then begins to 
question aloud the obvious redundancy, futility, and dubious reasonableness of this ritual.  Two 
lines in particular underscore his stance: “Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,” repeated 
twice (line 1 and line 35), and, in answer to his neighbor’s aphoristic insistence that “good fences 
make good neighbors” (lines 27 and 45), the question, “Why do they make good neighbors?” 
(line 30).  The other neighbor is portrayed rather unflatteringly by our speaker as an atavistic and 
insular character, an “old-stone savage armed” (line 40) who “moves in darkness” (41).  That he 
is given the last word—a re-emphasis of his aphorism—is often taken as a kind of defeat for the 
more enlightened perspective of the narrator. 
But the somewhat simple moralism of a thinker defeated by the intransigence of a rube is, of 
course, a classic Frostian red herring and undone—in this case—by a single fact: it is the narrator 
who initiates the ritual (line 12: “I let my neighbor know beyond the hill”).  This single, ironic 
line is devastating to any reading of the monologue that would regard the narrator as somehow 
distinct or excluded from the ritual and all it embodies symbolically.  For all of his cleverness 
and impish prodding of his comparatively slow-witted companion, he is not exempted from 
either the necessity of wall repair nor its implications.   
Among those implications is of course the idea that boundaries—however motivated by a savage 
or even feral suspicion of “other”—are pragmatic necessities that survive even the 
deconstruction of their practical justification.  But further is the implication of ineradicable 
boundaries themselves.  Wanted or not, justified or not, comprehensible or not—they persist, 
unmoved by mental acuity or imaginative desire. 
At times Frost can be much more direct and absolute in such pronouncements.  An example 
would be the lyrical “Nothing Gold Can Stay”: 
Nature’s first green is gold, 
Her hardest hue to hold. 
Her early leaf’s a flower; 
But only so an hour. 
Then leaf subsides to leaf. 
So Eden sank to grief, 
So dawn goes down to day. 
Nothing gold can stay. 
A summary of the rhetoric itself is virtually a synopsis of cyclical determinism: nature, first, 
early, only, hour, subside, sink, grief, down, nothing.  The only qualifying words attach to the 
hopeful aspects of the first four lines; the last four are causally inevitable and absolute.  This 
sketch, if you will, invites no exception. 
But it is my view that Frost’s most devilishly ensnaring poem—in the context of binding us, as it 
were, within given confines—is the sonnet “Design.”  Cleverly mimicking the stanzaic 
arrangement of an Italian sonnet (octave/sestet) while incorporating the internal trappings of the 
English variety (ottava rima, closing couplet, and tripartite perspective), the poem depicts a 
grotesque scene that for the speaker begs several impertinent (and theological) questions.  A 
white spider has taken up residence in a flower (“the heal-all,” or prunella vulgeris) that provides 
camouflage only by chance: normally blue, it is a mold, or blight, that has changed its hue.  
Within the spider’s grasp is a dead or dying white moth.  The sestet says it all: 
What had that flower to do with being white, 
The wayside blue and innocent heal-all? 
What brought the spider to that height, 
Then steered the white moth thither in the night? 
What but design of darkness to appall? 
If design govern in a thing so small. 
(lines 9--14) 
Rather like his spider, Frost has us trapped as the moth between two unpalatable conclusions: 
random chance that can yield such unlikely horror or determinism that yields certain destruction.  
And while many have tended to emphasize the cosmological ambiguity the series of questions 
recommends, I’m more compelled by the reinforcing message the prosody, which is only 
cosmetically ambiguous, delivers.  The poem itself is an ingenious and inescapable trap, and it 
would seem that preferring the possibility of chance is an accession to illusion, a refusal of the 
weight of the evidence. 
What is often considered Frost’s first “great” poem—“Mowing”—makes clear his position 
regarding the necessity of the Will to Order, i.e. the primacy of imaginative exertion in negating 
or ordering the inherently impersonal, inchoate, and indeed chaotic nature of this unified reality 
we call life.  “Mowing” was the central piece in Frost’s first official collection (he had 
previously published a chap book, Into My Own), A Boy’s Will (1913), and is also an irregular 
sonnet as well as the poem he most often cited as demonstrative of his theory of the “sound of 
sense.”   
The two “halves,” if you will, of “Mowing” form an argument.  The octave is a rumination.  
While describing the setting and action in which a scythe is being wielded on an overgrown 
pasture, there is a conspicuous accumulation of words that indicate absence, loneliness, 
inarticulacy, and isolation: “never,” “one,” “whispering” (three times in variance), “not” (three 
times),“myself,” “perhaps” (twice), “lack,” and “no.”  The sestet answers the implication of these 
terms: 
Anything more than the truth would have seemed too weak 
To the earnest love that laid the swale in rows, 
Not without feeble-pointed spikes of flowers 
(Pale orchises), and scared a bright green snake. 
The fact is the sweetest dream that labor knows. 
My long scythe whispered and left the hay to make. 
 (lines 9—14) 
The metaphor is unignorable: just as the purpose of mowing—a difficult labor that achieves no 
permanence—is an ordering that must be accepted as self-justifying, so all forms of laborious 
“ordering” are to be regarded.  What is achieved is a form of truth, and Frost is very pointed in 
rejecting alternatives (the speaker derides “gift(s) of idle hours” and “easy gold of fey or elf,” i.e. 
romanticism/escapism) as inferior or illusory.  The only true alternative—a Hobson’s choice per 
Frost—is chaos. 
 In order to discover why Frost found chaos, as such, so repulsive, we must look at one his last 
great poems, “Desert Places,” written three decades after “Mowing.”  Here, utilizing a rather 
disjunctive set of four quatrains that echo yet elide the regressive terza rima form he famously 
employed in “Stopping By Woods on a Snowy Evening,” there is another contemplation of a 
snow-filled vista.  The circumstance is unclear, and I’ve often thought the speed of the 
observations coupled with the distinct discontinuity suggest a passenger on a train (as opposed to 
the stationary horse rider of “Stopping by Woods”), but at any rate we begin with a rather terse 
description of a barren winter scene: 
Snow falling and night falling, fast, oh, fast 
In a field I looked into going past, 
And the ground almost covered smooth in snow, 
But a few weeds and stubble showing last. 
 (lines 1—4) 
The speaker then broadens his consideration to the surrounding woods and countryside, noting 
he too is a part of this tableau (“The loneliness includes me unawares”).  The third stanza 
succumbs to the incipient depression of the second’s projection of loneliness (“lonely as it is, that 
loneliness/Will be more ere it will be less”), and we appear to be headed toward a rare 
conclusion for a Frost poem: defeat. 
But the fourth stanza enacts a bizarre turn: 
They cannot scare me with their empty spaces 
Between stars—on stars where no human race is. 
I have it in me so much nearer some 
To scare myself with my own desert places. 
 (lines 13—16) 
First, there is the jarring invocation of “they” after all the emphasis of loneliness.  And who are 
they, exactly?  Astronomers, apparently, given “their” alleged pronouncements concerning stars 
and vast emptiness.  But second, we arrive unexpectedly back where Frost so often takes us—but 
this time with notable truculence: that’s big…but I’m bigger than that. 
 
In effect, then, Frost chastens in “Desert Places” the prophets of science, in the form of 
astronomers, for asking the wrong questions.  Instead of “Are we all alone?” or “Is this [material] 
all there is?, “ he’s rather asking “Will I be or remain equal to the task of meaningful ordering?”  
In saying “they cannot scare me” and “I have it in me,” he is saying that he has always known 
that nothingness was the consequence, the default setting, of the world writ large.  The only real 
issue is whether imagination is capable of combating it. 
But that combat, if you will, takes a toll, and just as the entropic decay affects his mending wall, 
Frost depicts the decline of will in “After Apple Picking.”  And that inevitable weariness that 
ends with death brings us to the subject of suffering born of desire.  The speaker in “After Apple 
Picking” admits his condition and qualifies it as consequential of his ambition: 
For I have had too much 
Of apple-picking: I am overtired 
Of the great harvest I myself desired 
(lines 27—29) 
If we take the harvesting of the apples as metaphorical of the development of knowledge—and 
the configuration of the world within an intelligible frame—we may interpret these lines as 
something of a self-admonition, though one redolent of futile lament: if I hadn’t gone at this 
quite so hard, perhaps I wouldn’t be at the point of collapse.  But, of course, as we already know, 
Frost doesn’t really see a genuine alternative, and the speaker goes off to his slumber not 
knowing whether his figurative rest will be either temporary—like the cyclical hibernation of a 
woodchuck—or “just…human,” i.e., paradoxically both brief and permanent per the tenor and 
vehicle of the symbol. 
“To Earthward” offers a contrasting attitude to the sleepy defeatism of “After Apple Picking.”  
First of all, it is sensual and robust, even defiantly so.  The almost-lewd sexuality inherent in 
words like “love,” “lips,” “touch,” “flow,” “musk,” “ache,” “spray,’ “stain,” “stiff,” “sore,” 
“hand,” “hard,” and “length” is obviously intentional, unusual for Frost (although not without 
concord—see “The Silken Tent”), and almost always shocking when pointed out to my students.  
But the poem is “about” more than rough sex; rather, it’s more fully about an attitude of mature 
embrace of the pain of existence.  Campbell has written of initiation rituals in what he terms the 
“primitive” world. 
…where direct confrontations with brutal bloody facts of life are inescapable and 
unremitting .  [The ceremonies] to which growing youngsters are subjected are frequently 
horrendous, confronting them in the most appalling, vivid terms, with experiences…of 
this monstrous thing that is life: and always with the requirement of ‘yea,’ with no sense 
of either personal or collective guilt, but gratitude and exhilaration (180) 
 In reading “To Earthward,” one recognizes that Frost would not think such ceremonies primitive 
at all.  On the contrary, the speaker dismisses the pleasures of his youth, when he “lived on air” 
and “craved strong sweets.” 
Now no joy but lacks salt, 
That is not dashed with pain 
And weariness and fault; 
I crave the stain 
Of tears, the aftermark 
Of almost too much love, 
The sweet of bitter bark 
And burning clove. 
When stiff and sore and scarred 
I take away my hand 
From leaning on it hard 
In grass and sand, 
The hurt is not enough: 
I long for the weight and strength 
To feel the earth as rough 
To all my length. 
(lines 17—32) 
There is indeed exhilaration and gratitude in these lines, the sanguine belief that the 
diminishment of nerve endings and taste buds that physically necessitates “harder” impulses and 
stimuli are a trustworthy analogue to a spiritual existence that is closer to truth, an undeniable 
good. 
 
But I would be remiss if I did not delve a bit into what I see as Frost’s addition to the list of 
preconditions—what we may call the cruel inscrutability of choices.  The theme is everywhere, 
frankly, in his oeuvre: in the playful invitation of “The Pasture” (“You come too”); the desperate 
threat of the scorned husband in “Home Burial” (“I’ll follow and bring you back by force.  I 
will!”); the casual misogyny of “The Sound of Trees” (Some day…I shall be gone”); and most 
especially in the dramatic turning away from disillusion at the end of “Stopping by Woods” 
(“But I have promises to keep”).  Frost’s personae are frequently poised like casually tossed 
coins above a determinative earth.  That he found choices—particularly what he termed possibly 
“reckless” choices (in “The Sound of Trees”)—so ubiquitous and therefore unavoidable is 
readily apparent by their prominence throughout his work.  But the poem that most thoroughly 
explores the issue, and most vividly demonstrates the cruel aspect of what we may call human 
choices, is “The Road Not Taken.” 
It is among his most well-known works.  I seldom go long in my life without meeting a relative 
stranger who, upon learning that I am a Frost scholar, will readily recite the poem’s famous 
opening pentet: 
 Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could travel both 
And be one traveler, long I stood 
And looked down one as far as I could 
To where it bent in the undergrowth 
 (lines 1—5) 
There was a time when I detested the poem for this very reason.  There was something about its 
popularity that made it seem shallow to me, and I found it relatively easy to ignore in my studies, 
secure in my conviction that it was obviously not a “serious” piece of work, that it was silly in 
the way that the Stones’ “Satisfaction” is silly: a jokey, half-baked idea that took on a life of its 
own once it reached the public.  So I rejected it…until I had an epiphany. 
I was re-reading Lathem’s full collection of Frost’s works in preparation for my dissertation 
defense, and one day I turned the page and there it was: “The Road Not Taken.”  From 
somewhere inside the voice of Ricardo Montalban as Khan in the second Star Trek movie—
channeling Melville’s Captain Ahab-- leaped into my mind: “With my last breath…I spit at 
thee.”  Nonetheless, I drew a sigh, and read, and…started to cry.  The tears were dotting the page 
before I was even aware of how immensely sad I had suddenly become.  Not knowing what had 
come over me, I read again…and began to sob even harder.  I was at work, and my door was 
open onto a heavily-trafficked hallway, so I was suddenly in terror of being seen.  I packed up 
my things and went home, still hitching in my chest the whole way there.  And I still, even after I 
gathered myself, had no idea what had just happened.   
More than half suspecting that I was losing my mind—perhaps from the stress of the dissertation 
process—I decided to go for a long walk and try to get a handle on what to do.  Should I seek 
help?  Remember, as far as I was concerned this was no more sensible than bursting into tears 
over a beer jingle.  Clearly I was unstable.  Then, about a mile on my walk into what was, in fact, 
a yellow wood, it hit me: “The Road Not Taken” wasn’t shallow.  It never had been; I was.   
The key is in the last stanza: 
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I— 
I took the one less travelled by, 
And that has made all the difference 
 (lines 16—20) 
Contrary to popular interpretation, “The Road Not Taken” is not an affirmation of independence 
or self-determination (one reason why it is often misnamed “The Road Less Travelled”).  Rather, 
it is a ruthlessly vivid and achingly pure meditation on an unavoidable fact: we must and will 
choose among and between incompatible directions in life.  We will always remember having 
made the more excruciating choices, and we will likely be certain that some difference—notably 
uncharacterized in the poem—has been effected.  But what we cannot—indeed shall not—ever 
know, is whether we chose “correctly.”   
So why did I cry?  Because I had just made an excruciating life choice.  My then wife had left 
me, moved to a far northern state, and then in effect said, “Join me, or say goodbye.”  I thought 
about it as long as she would allow, which turned out to be the better part of autumn.  Then I said 
goodbye.  But I wasn’t in any way certain that I was right.  In fact, I’d say I rather more 
suspected pride had corrupted my deliberations.  And reading “The Road Not Taken” that day 
made me realize that I would never know, that—as Frost puts it—“way leads on to way” (line 
14), and not only was that alternative path soon to be an overgrown and distant mystery but also 
that I could torture myself for the rest of my days about some alternative “me” living out a 
different (“better” was the real fear) existence on that path. 
And though I was not a child in years, I shamefully realized Frost had shown me that until very 
recently I remained one in understanding.  Whether by chance or design, I had managed to live 
over thirty years without making any truly hard choices.  And now that I had made one, I was 
caught in an illusion—perhaps that I could go this way and realistically imagine my way in the 
other, but also that in keeping the memory of the divergence vivid I might find a future 
intersection between the two.  I saw with vividness that day that it could not be—“way leads on 
to way,” and any alternative is pure illusion.   
So—to hopefully bring this full circle—when I assert that Campbell and Frost provide ample 
evidence for moral formation in literature, which I can only interpret in my limited fashion and 
according to their lights to mean “a sense of what is true and therefore, at minimum, usefully 
good,” it is with both an awareness of the literature and—just as importantly—because I have 
experienced the good within their stern and admittedly forbidding medicine.  And while I don’t 
feel it is quite as cynical as my favorite line from The Princess Bride—“Life is pain; anyone who 
says differently is selling something”—it is tough stuff.  It asks if you have the courage to accept 
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